In United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. __ (2024), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a federal law that prohibits individuals under a domestic violence restraining order from possessing firearms. The Court ruled that when someone is found by a court to pose a credible threat to another person’s physical safety, temporarily disarming them is consistent with the Second Amendment.
Facts of the Case
Zackey Rahimi was indicted under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8), a federal law that prohibits those under a domestic violence restraining order from possessing firearms. A prosecution under this law can only proceed if the restraining order meets certain criteria: it must either find that the defendant poses a credible threat to their intimate partner or their partner’s child, §922(g)(8)(C)(i), or explicitly prohibit the use or threat of physical force against them, §922(g)(8)(C)(ii).
Rahimi admitted that the restraining order against him met these criteria but argued that §922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment. The District Court rejected Rahimi’s argument to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds. While his case was on appeal, the Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), stating that any firearm regulation challenged under the Second Amendment must align with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
Based on the Bruen decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision, ruling that the Government failed to show that §922(g)(8) aligns with the historical tradition of firearm regulation in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision by an 8-1 vote. It ruled that individuals found to pose a credible threat to another’s physical safety could be disarmed without violating the Second Amendment.
“When a restraining order contains a finding that an individual poses a credible threat to the physical safety of an intimate partner, that individual may—consistent with the Second Amendment—be banned from possessing firearms while the order is in effect,” wrote Chief Justice John Roberts for the Court. He emphasized that since the founding of the United States, laws have existed to prevent individuals who threaten harm from misusing firearms.
The Court noted that some courts had misapplied recent Second Amendment cases by being too rigid in their interpretation of the Bruen decision. Chief Justice Roberts clarified that the Second Amendment covers more than just firearms that existed at the founding and does not limit regulations to those that were identical to those from 1791.
According to the Court, lower courts should determine if a new law is “relevantly similar” to historical laws that were understood to be permissible. For example, if founding-era laws regulated firearm use to address specific problems, contemporary laws with similar restrictions for similar reasons are likely permissible.
In this case, the Court concluded that §922(g)(8) met these standards. Chief Justice Roberts cited historical laws, such as surety laws that required individuals posing a threat to post a bond and “going armed” laws that punished those who threatened others with firearms. Like these historical laws, §922(g)(8)(C)(i) targets individuals identified by a court as threats to others’ safety, making it “relevantly similar” in its purpose and application. The Court further found that §922(g)(8) appropriately limits firearm use to prevent threats of physical violence, much like the surety and going armed laws of the past. “Together, the surety and going armed laws confirm what common sense suggests: When an individual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote.